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I. THE ILLEGALITY OF THE 1982 ORDINANCE A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THIS 
CASE 
The fact that the Canyon County Commissioners in 1982 violated state law and thereby 
enacted a void herd district ordinance is critical to this appeal. The other parties' attempt to gloss 
over the fact that in 1982 the Canyon County Commissioners chose to enact a herd district wholly 
outside of the statutory framework for taking such an action. The Commissioners failed to comply 
with Idaho Law by failing to obtain a landowner petition and did not provide notice to the public or 
provide for the required hearing prior to acting. By failing to act pursuant to a petition, the void 
ordinance was flawed by failing to designate the boundaries of the district, the type of animal to 
which it would apply and in failing to provide a beginning date as required by statute. Idaho Code § 
25-2402 et seq. 
Judge Petrie acknowledged this in his rnling stating: 
Piercy contended these flaws overcome the presumption of validity of the herd district; 
hence, this court must strike it down. At that time, the court did not adopt with Piercy's 
position. After the benefit of a trial on the issue, and seeing firsthand how the county failed 
at virtually every level to follow the Code, the court no longer disagrees with Piercy. 
R. Vol. 6, p. 968. Interestingly, Judge Petrie also included the following statement in footnote no. 
9: 
Id. 
At the time of Piercy's original motion for summary judgment, Canyon County had not 
entered as a party and the other parties did not have the benefit of any "inside" information 
of what the County may have done to satisfy the Code requirements. Ironically, in 
hindsight, the court could just as easily have entered judgment on behalf of Piercy based 
upon his original motion for summary judgment. 
Piercy proved at trial that the Canyon County Commissioners violated state law in creating 
the 1982 ordinance, the parties defending the ordinance want this Court to rnle that this void 
ordinance is now unassailable due to the statute of limitations in I.C. § 31-857. This argument 
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would allow legislative bodies to insulate their illegal acts by creating preventing challenges to 
those actions after the actions have already been ruled illegal. 
Even more stunning is Respondent's argmnent that all other laws, ordinances or statutes 
become unassailable from any challenge after four years due to I.C. § 5-224 despite the nature or 
severity of any potential defect in the law. While I.C. § 31-857 limits its effect to challenges to 
procedural requirements, there is no such limitation under Respondents' interpretation of I.C. § 5-
224. Based upon Respondents' interpretation, I.C. § 5-224 would prevent any challenge to an 
ordinance after four years unless specifically allowed in a more specific section of the Idaho Code. 
Surely, the Idaho Legislature did not intend to use such a vague and blunt instrument as a catch-all 
statute of limitations to categorically prevent people from challenging illegal ordinances after four 
years. 
Adopting the arguments of Respondents would create a legislative environment in Idaho 
where legislators, county commissioners and city board members would be emboldened to 
disregard procedural and substantive limits on lawmaking and pass laws in violation of the statutory 
protections. As long as the government is able to keep their abuses secret long enough, then the law 
would become free from challenges. 
This case is the prime example. It was proven that the Canyon County commissioners 
disregarded the law at "every level" in passing the 1982 Ordinance. R. Vol. 6, p. 968. Due to the 
abuses of not acting according to a landowner petition and without proper notice, the people of 
Canyon County had little or no chance of knowing what had occurred. Now, the Respondents want 
to ignore the illegal actions of the commissioners and have the void 1982 ordinance made valid by 
preventing anyone from challenging the ordinance. This method of validating illegally enacted 
districts could be used by county commissioners in enacting, modifying or disbanding herd districts, 
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school districts, highway districts and canal districts. Therefore, it is important in this matter to 
recognize that the 1982 Ordinance was proven to have been illegally passed. 
II. THE 2009 AMENDMENT TO IDAHO CODE§ 31-857 DOES NOT PREVENT MR. 
PIERCY FROM CHALLENGING THE 1982 ORDINANCE 
The evidence and law establish that the Idaho Legislature's 2009 amendment of I.C. § 31-
857 does not prevent Mr. Piercy's challenge to foe 1982 Ordinance. The 2009 amendment is not 
retroactive based upon the plain language of the amendment and the evidence surrounding the 
enactment of the legislation. Further, even if the 2009 amendment does apply to all previously 
established herd districts, the statute of limitations created by the 2009 amendment would have 
begun to nm on the date of enactment of July 1, 2009. 
A. The Plain Language of the 2009 Amendment does not Clearly Indicate an Intention 
that the Statute of Limitation be Retroactive. 
The amendatory language of LC. § 31-857 states "No challenge to the proceedings or 
jurisdictional steps preceding such an order, shall be heard or considered after seven (7) years has 
lapsed from the date of the order." This sentence is separated from the preceding sentence by a 
period. The first sentence reads: 
Whenever any school district, road district, herd district or other district has 
heretofore been, or shall hereafter be, declared to be created, established, disestablished, 
dissolved, or modified, by an order of the board of county commissioners in any county of 
the state ofldaho, a legal prima facie presumption is hereby declared to exist, after a lapse of 
two (2) years from the date of such order, that all proceedings and jurisdictional steps 
preceding the making of such order have been properly and regularly taken so as to warrant 
said board in making said order, and the burden of proof shall rest upon the party who shall 
deny, dispute, or question the validity of said order to show that any such preceding 
proceedings or jurisdictional steps were not properly or regularly taken; such prima facie 
presumption shall be a rule of evidence in all courts in the state ofldaho. 
The previously cited amended language does not use the same retroactive language as the 
original sentence. Nor does the added sentence as a part of the paragraph, by its structure or 
verbiage, require an interpretation that includes the retroactive language of the original sentence. It 
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is just as consistent with the structure of the paragraph to read the amendatory language as not being 
retroactive. 
When reading the plain language of the statute, the paragraph describes two different 
statutes of limitation. The original limitation in the first sentence creates a presumption of validity 
after two years have passed since the enactment of the district. This limitation makes it much more 
difficult for an entity or person to challenge the validity of a district. The new statute of limitation 
creates an absolute bar on challenging the validity of the districts. A plain reading of the 
amendment to I.C. § 31-857 shows that the absolute bar was not to be applied retroactively whereas 
the first limitation creating a presumption does state that it is to be applied retroactively. 
Idaho Code § 73-101 states, "No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless 
expressly so declared." There is no express language in the amendatory language of LC. § 31-857 
that the absolute bar to recovery is to be applied retroactively. The amendatory language of I.C. § 
31-857 simply does not include retroactive language. Since the express language of the amendment 
does not include retroactive language, then the amendment should be applied prospectively. 
B. The Statute of Limitations in Amended LC. § 31-857 Began to Run on July 1, 2009, 
Even if the Statute was Retroactively Applied to All Previous Herd Districts. 
Neither Judge Ford or Respondents recognize that even if a statute of limitations is applied 
retroactively, the statute will begin to run at the time of enactment or a reasonable time will be 
provided to accrued cases. 
The point is best illustrated by the case Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 232 P.3d 813 (2010), 
that Respondent Sutton relies upon in her brief. Defendant/Respondent/Cross Appellant Jennifer 
Sutton's Respondent Cross-Appellant's Brief at 26. The Supreme Court in Stuart was considering a 
statute of limitations that was enacted after the Appellant's conviction as part of LC. § 19-2719. 
Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 232 P.3d 813 (2010). This Court analyzed some important concepts 
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regarding statute of limitations, holding that, "we have noted that where a statute is procedural or 
merely 'draws upon facts antecedent to its enactment' it will be held to be prospective in nature." Id 
at 43, 232 P.3d at 821; citing: Bryant v. City of Blackfoot, 137 Idaho 307, 313, 48 P.3d 636, 642 
(2002). This Court continued holding: 
The original enactment of I. C. § 19-2719 included language making it applicable to 
convictions prior to the statute's enactment, but it was not, itself, "retroactive" in any 
substantive sense. 1984 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 159, § 8, p. 390 ('This act shall apply to all 
cases in which capital sentences were imposed on or prior to the effective date of this act but 
which have not been carried out, and to all capital cases arising after the effective date of 
this act.'). 
Id at 43, 149 Idaho at 821. The enacting language cited above is very similar to the language in 
I.C. § 31-857 that Respondents argue makes the statute of limitation in the amendment to I.C. § 31-
857 substantively retroactive. The Respondents mistakenly attempt to make the argument that ifthe 
amendment to I.C. § 31-857 applies to previously enacted herd districts then it necessarily follows 
that the statute retroactively began to run on the date that the previous herd districts were enacted. 
This Court in Stuart rejected that approach holding that: "As LC. § 19-2719 is a statute of 
limitations, the requirement that a petition be timely filed in compliance with the requirements of 
the statute began at the date of enactment for those cases involving convictions occurring at an 
earlier date." Id 
In holding that statutes of limitation applied retroactively to previous cases begin to run on 
the date the statute of limitation was enacted, this Court in Stuart was following a long line of 
authority. One such case is University of Utah Hosp. on Behalf of Harris v. Pence, 104 Idaho 
172, 174, 657 P.2d 469, 471 (1982). The facts in Pence are similar to those in the present case. 
In Pence, Plaintiff hospital filed an application for aid for the medically indigent with the Twin 
Falls County Clerk within a year of the hospital admission. The medical indigency statute, Idaho 
Code § 31-3504, was then amended reducing the one-year statute to a 45-day period of 
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limitations from the date of admission to file the application. This statutory provision became 
effective July 1, 1976 (1976 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 121), a time subsequent to the admission and 
release of the Harrises' child from the hospital. The hospital's claim for payment was denied; suit 
was filed; and summary judgment was granted to defendant. The hospital then appealed. 
This Court stated: 
Applied retroactively, the 1976 version of LC. § 31-3504 would have required 
the application to have been made by April 10, 1976, some two and a half months before 
the effective date of the law. Clearly, such retroactive application would unfairly penalize 
the appellant for failure to comply with a statute of which it had no notice. 
University of Utah Hosp. on Behalf of Harris v. Pence, 104 Idaho at 174, 657 P.2d at 471 (1982). 
This Court then quoted from Olivas v. Weiner, 127 Cal.App.2d 597, 274 P.2d 476 (1954) 
as follows: 
A statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon facts existing prior to its 
enactment. Thus changes in procedural law have been held applicable to existing causes 
of action. The effect of such statutes is actually prospective in nature since they relate to 
the procedure to be followed in the future. National Automobile & Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Downey, 98 Cal.App.2d 586, 590, 220 P.2d 962; Argues v. National Superior Co., 67 
Cal.App.2d 763, 778, 155 P.2d 643; Earle v. Froedtert Grain & }vfalting Co., 197 Wash. 
341, 85 P.2d 264. Olivas v. Weiner, 274 P.2d at 478, 479. 
University of Utah Hosp. on Behalf of Harris v. Pence, 104 Idaho at 175, 657 P.2d at 472 (1982). 
Finally, this Court quoted from a Washington case stating, "Similarly, in Earle v. 
Froedtert Grain & jlvfalting Co., supra, the court stated that '[t]he limitation prescribed by the 
new statute commenced when the cause of action was first subjected to the operation of the 
statute, that is, upon its effective date.' 85 P.2d at 266." 
The reasoning of University of Utah Hosp. on Behalf of Harris v. Pence, has been 
followed by Idaho's appellate courts in cases involving Idaho Code § 14-4902, Idaho's version 
of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act [UPCPA]. Esquivel v. State, 128 Idaho 390, 391, 
913 P.2d 1160, 1161 (1996); Afartinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530, 534, 944 P.2d 127, 13 l(Ct. App. 
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1997); LaFon v. State, 119 Idaho 387, 389-90, 807 P.2d 66, 68-69 (Ct. App. 1991); and 
1\1ellinger v. State, 113 Idaho 31, 32, 740 P.2d 73,74 (Ct. App. 1987). Effective July 1, 1979, the 
UPCPA was amended to provide a five-year limitation period for filing an application for post-
conviction relief. Prior to 1979, the UPCPA, like Idaho Code § 31-857 prior to 2009, had no 
period of limitations at all. In Mellinger, the Idaho Court of Appeals decided the issue of whether 
the five-year limitation period mandated by the amendment applied to a conviction entered 
before the effective date of the amendment. In finding that it did, the Court of Appeals cited and 
followed University of Utah Hosp. on Behalf of Harris v. Pence agreeing with the district court 
that the five-year period of limitations for filing an application began on the date of July 1, 1979, 
the effective date of the amended statute. The Court of Appeals stated further that the 
amendment was being applied prospectively because retroactive application of such a time 
limitation would be contrary to general principles of law and Idaho Code § 73-101. Mellinger v. 
State, 113 Idaho 31, 33-34, 740 P.2d 73, 74-75 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Thus, following the reasoning of this Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals the statute of 
limitations in the amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 should be considered to have begun 
running on the date of enactment with regard to all previously enacted herd districts. Therefore, 
Mr. Piercy's challenge to the 1982 Ordinance that was decided by trial prior to the enactment of 
the period of limitations in the amendment to I.C. § 31-857 should not be barred by the 
limitation. To do so would unfairly penalize litigants, including Mr. Piercy, for failure to comply 
with a statute of which he had no notice. 
Respondent Guzman attempts to rely upon the case of Chase Securities Corporation v. 
Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 65 S. Ct. 1137 (1945) in arguing that the statute of limitations in the 
amended I.C. § 31-857 should bar Mr. Piercy from challenging the 1982 Ordinance. However, 
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the facts in Chase are distinguishable from the facts in our case. In Chase, Plaintiff Donaldson 
wanted to rescind a purchase of securities as void under the Minnesota Blue Sky Laws. 
Defendant Chase argued that the action was barred by the existing statute of limitations. 
Defendant argued that once it had a decision in its favor, the state legislature could not revive 
Plaintiff's cause of action and put a new statute of limitations in place. The new statute of 
limitations allowed actions under the Blue Sky Laws to be brought within six years after delivery 
of the securities, or where delivery had occurred more than five years prior to the effective date 
of the act, one year after the date of enactment. 
The U.S. Supreme Court pointed out that the Minnesota Supreme Court, in the initial 
appeal, had ruled only that the Blue Sky Law six-year statute of limitations had not been tolled 
on the grounds that Chase was absent from the state. All other issues were remanded without 
prejudice to the trial court. While the proceedings were pending in the trial court, the Minnesota 
legislature amended the Blue Sky Law adding a specific statute of limitation applicable to 
actions raised by plaintiff in the suit based on violations of the Blue Sky Laws as above. The 
effect of the amendment was to abolish any defenses Chase might make under the previous 
statute of limitation. In a second appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that securities had 
to be registered, and this was violated by the sale. It also held that the action was one for 
damages in tort to recover the purchase price of unregistered securities, that the newly enacted 
statute of limitations was applicable, and that this had the effect of lifting the bar of the general 
limitation statute, and in doing so, did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The U. S. Supreme Court held that as the case stood in the state court, Chase's statutory 
immunity was not fully judged. Thus, the action of the legislature in amending the statute of 
limitations did not deprive it of a judgment in its favor. The Supreme Court relied upon the case 
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of Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 62, 5 S.Ct. 209 (1385), which had held that a lapse of time had not 
invested a party with title to real or personal property, and a state legislature, consistent with the 
Fourteenth Amendment, may repeal or extend a statute of limitations, even after the right of 
action had been barred. The plaintiff was then restored his remedy, and the defendant was 
deprived of his defense that the action was barred by the previous statute of limitations. The 
Fourteenth Amendment does not make an act of state legislation void merely because it has some 
retrospective operation. 
The facts in Chase were that a securities purchaser tried to get his money back because 
defendant sold him unregistered securities. Purchaser waited longer that the general statute of 
limitations to bring his action against defendant. While the case was pending, the state legislature 
amended the specific securities statute oflimitation to, in effect revive plaintiff's cause of action. 
In our case, instead of reviving a cause of action, Respondents would have this Court extinguish 
the defense of Mr. Piercy by retroactively applying a newly enacted statute of limitations when 
Mr. Piercy had no notice of the statute. In addition, instead of a case pending on procedural 
motions prior to a trial, as in Chase, in our case, there has been a full trial and a decision by the 
finder of fact and law, Judge Petrie. Both the facts and the application of the law in Chase are 
distinguishable from the facts and law in the present case. Chase should not be followed. 
The net effect of the 2009 amendment to I.C. § 31-857 is to extend the Canyon County 
Commissioners' liability on the 1982 Ordinance for seven years until 2016. The amendment to 
I.C. § 31-857 is not retroactive not only because there is no evidence of legislative intent to do 
so, but because Idaho's appellate courts have ruled that it is prospective beginning on the date of 
its enactment on July 1, 2009. 
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Based upon the law and facts, Mr. Piercy requests this Court find that the statute of 
limitations in amended I.C. § 31-857 does not prevent Mr. Piercy's challenge to the 1982 
Ordinance or rescind Judge Petrie's decision following the trial on the merits that the 1982 
Ordinance is void. 
III. THE CATCH-ALL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN I.C. § 5-224 DOES NOT 
PREVENT MR. PIERCY FROM CHALLENGING THE 1982 ORDINANCE 
Idaho Code § 5-224 does not apply to Mr. Piercy's challenge to the 1982 Ordinance because 
( 1) a more specific statute controlled the issue of challenging districts; (2) the application of LC. § 
5-224 would lead to an absurd result and (3) statutes of limitation do not apply to affirmative 
defenses. 
A. The Pre-2009 Version of I.C. § 31-857 Exclusively Controlled the Time Frames for 
Bringing Challenges to Ordinance Involving Districts 
Idaho Code § 5-201, states, "Civil actions can only be commenced within the periods 
prescribed in this chapter after the cause of action shall have accmed, except when, in special 
cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute." I.C. § 5-224 (2012) (Emphasis added). 
Also, this Court has stated the rule that courts apply the more specific statute of limitations when 
there is more than one which could apply. Farmers Nat'!. Bank v. Wickhap Pipeline, 114 Idaho 
565, 569, 759 P.2d 71, 75 (1988). 
The Idaho Legislature chose to create a special statute governmg the procedure for 
challenges to the different district ordinances enacted by counties. This statute is I.C. § 31-857. 
As discussed extensively by all parties in the briefing, I.C. § 31-857 prior to the 2009 
amendment contained a specific time limitation to challenges to the formation, modification or 
dissolution of various districts. The time limitation forced litigants challenging the procedural 
requirements of a county ordinance to face a presumption of validity after two years had passed 
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since the ordinance's enactment. The burden of challengers to overcome a presumption of 
validity is a significant protection to an existing ordinance. 
Despite having specifically limited challenges to county ordinances regarding districts, 
the Idaho Legislature did not place any other time limitation on challenging the ordinances. The 
lack of any absolute time bar in the pre-2009 I.C. § 31-857 shows the Idaho Legislature's 
intention that the two-year limitation in I.C. § 31-857 was the only statutory time limitation to 
challenges to county ordinances affecting districts. 
Respondents argue that the lack of an absolute time barring limitation in the pre-2009 I.C. 
§ 31-857 meant that the Idaho Legislature intended for such challenges to be limited by I.C. § 5-
224. The Idaho Legislature, however, made its contrary position clear in the matter when they 
adopted the 2009 amendment to I.C. § 31-857. 
Judge Ford, Respondents, and Mr. Piercy have cited extensively to the legislative history 
of the 2009 amendment to LC.§ 31-857. Mr. Piercy agrees that it is clear the Idaho Legislature 
felt the need to adopt an additional statute of limitations that would establish an absolute time bar 
on challenges to county ordinances involving districts. The undisputed purpose of the Idaho 
Legislature was to limit "unreasonably delayed legal challenges to the procedures used by the 
County Commission ... " Appendix B to Appellant's Brief. 
Based upon the Idaho Legislature's actions and stated purpose, it would be absurd to 
think that the legislature was trying to prevent delayed legal challenges by changing the 
applicable statute of limitation from a four-year statute of limitation to a seven-year statute of 
limitation. It would be embarrassing and futile to find that the Idaho Legislature is spending 
time, effort and tax dollars to create legislation that operates in opposition to its stated purpose. 
The Idaho Legislature certainly recognized that under the current laws there was no statute of 
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limitations that created an absolute time bar to challenges to county ordinances involving 
districts and therefore passed legislation amending LC. § 31-857 to create one. Any other 
interpretation of the legislature's actions in this regard would defy logic. 
Further, the history of the passage of LC. § 31-857 also shows that there was no 
limitation barring challenges to ordinances prior to the enactment of I.C. § 31-857. Idaho Code § 
31-857 was originally enacted in 1935. See: Appendix A. LC. § 31-857 when originally enacted 
stated that after five years, there would be a presumption of validity of county ordinances. Id. It 
was not until 1989 that limit was changed to two years. 
Idaho Code § 5-224 was previously designated as R.C. § 4060. See: Appendix B. 
Revised Codes § 4060 was also a four year catch-all statute of limitation and it pre-dated the 
1935 enactment ofl.C. § 31-857. 
If I.C. § 5-224 or its previous enactments applied to challenges to districts created by 
counties, then the enactment of I.C. § 31-857 would have been meaningless. For this statute 
would create a presumption of validity for ordinances that would take effect one year after I.C. § 
5-224 would apply. Therefore, the statute of limitations would prevent challenges to the 
ordinance before the presumption of validity would come into effect. 
It is clear from the legislative history that the Idaho Legislature never intended to have 
I.C. § 5-224 apply to challenges to county ordinances or any other law. Mr. Piercy requests that 
this Court find that I.C. § 5-224 does not apply to Mr. Piercy's challenge to the 1982 Ordinance. 
B. The Application of Idaho Code § 5-224 to Challenges to Void Ordinances Should not 
be Allowed. 
This Court has held that, "The Court interprets statutes according to their plain, express 
meaning, but will resort to judicial construction when the statute is 'ambiguous, incomplete, 
absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws.' Id. This Court disfavors a statutory construction 
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that would lead to absurd or umeasonably harsh results. Id. at 690, 85 P.3d at 666." Ada County 
Highway District v. TS!, 145 Idaho 360, 368, 179 P.3d 323, 331 (2008). 
Respondents argue that I.C. § 5-224 would prevent all procedural and substantive 
challenges to statutes and ordinances after four years. Surely if the Idaho Legislature had meant 
to take such a drastic step in limiting the rights of citizens to challenge flawed and void laws, it 
would have specifically set forth that limitation and not left it to a vague catch-all statute of 
limitation. 
Respondents cite the case of Canady v. Coeur d'Alene Lumber Co., 21 Idaho 77, 120 P. 
830 (1911) in support of their position that I.C. § 5-224 would apply to bar challenges to the 
present challenge to the 1982 Ordinance. At first blush, Canady seems to bear a resemblance to 
the present case in that a property owner was challenging a city ordinance based partially upon 
there being no citizen petition or means whereby damages could be ascertained as required by 
the Idaho Code. Id. at 86, 120 P. at 839. The city in part, was claiming that the property owner's 
claims were barred by estoppel and statutes of limitation. Id. This is where the similarities end. 
A close reading of the opinion's analysis shows that it is unhelpful in our present case. 
Before reaching any reasoning regarding the statutes of limitation, this Court reasoned 
that the action taken by Coeur d'Alene was not the type of action that required a petition by the 
property holders. Id. at 87, 120 P. at 840. After citing the statute that required a property owner 
petition where a city sought to sell or convey a street or alley, the opinion stated, "We do not 
understand this to be a case where the city has sought to sell or convey the streets and alleys 
within the city, ... " Id. 
The opinion also found that only property owners that abutted the streets or alleys to be 
vacated could bring the type of claim for damages that was being attempted and that the 
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Appellant was not such a property owner. Id. at 89, 120 P. at 842. 
It was only after deciding the issue on other grounds that the opinion discussed the raised 
statutes of limitation. It stated: 
It is next contended that appellant's cause of action, if she had one, was barred by 
the statute of limitations, subd. 1 of sec. 4054 and secs. 4037, 4038 and 4060, Rev. 
Codes. We think under the facts of this case that this action is barred by the statute of 
limitations, and that this action should have been brought at least within five years from 
the date such cause of action arose. 
Id. at 93, 120 P. at 846. The opinion does not state which statute of limitation it applied nor does 
it provide any further reasoning for its rule. This part of the opinion is certainly dicta 
considering entire matter was decided upon other grounds. It is also unhelpful to the present 
case in that the opinion cited a five-year statute of limitation where the catch-all statute is a four-
year limitation. Also, since the opinion had already held that the city did not violate any 
procedural requirements in enacting the ordinance, the application of the statutes of limitation 
would only refer to the damage claim of the property owner. Therefore, this Court's dicta does 
not create precedent. It is not persuasive in analyzing the present case where we are dealing with 
a void ordinance. The Respondents cannot rely upon Canady for their argument that I.C. § 5-
224 should apply to the present case. 
Therefore, Mr. Piercy requests that this Court find that the 1982 Ordinance was void and 
that I.C. § 5-224 does not apply to challenges to the enforcement of void ordinances. 
C. Statutes of Limitation do not Apply to an Affirmative Defense 
Idaho cases have held that statutes of limitation do not apply to pure defenses, but are 
applicable only where affirmative relief is sought. Alorton v. Whitson, 45 Idaho 28, 260 P. 426 
(1927). This Court stated: 
The general rule is that the statutes of limitation are not applicable to defenses. . . . And 
where the defendant in an action on a note pleads total failure of consideration, and 
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alleges a parol warranty of property for which the note was given, the plaintiff cannot 
avoid the defense by insisting on the statute of limitations. (Citation omitted). 
Id., 45 Idaho at 33, 260 P. at 427. 
Mr. Piercy answered Mr. Guzman's complaint with an affirmative defense. Mr. Piercy 
did not ask for affirmative relief until required to do so when the declaratory judgment action 
was ordered to be filed by Judge Petrie. Appellant's Brief at p. 3-4. 
Respondents only response to these facts is that Mr. Piercy did end up requesting 
affirmative relief. This was not Mr. Piercy's action, but Judge Petrie's. Mr. Piercy's defense 
was that there was no valid herd district ordinance that required him to keep his cattle contained. 
The defense was then made as a matter of a motion for summary judgment. Judge Petrie then 
ordered that a separate declaratory relief action be filed to require a trial on the validity of the 
1982 Ordinance. 
Mr. Piercy should not be penalized for being forced into a situation where his affirmative 
defense became a separate trial. This discussion not only shows the injustice that would occur if 
Mr. Piercy is not allowed his defense, but supports the arguments below regarding Respondents' 
waiver of any statute of limitation defenses. Respondents encouraged the district court to delay 
ruling on Mr. Plercy' s motion for summary judgment and then sat by while the Court ordered a 
separate trial on the issue of the validity of the 1982 herd district ordinance. In fact, it was 
Respondent Sutton that insisted that the district court order Canyon County to be a party in the 
trial regarding the validity of the 1982 Ordinance. R. Vol. 2, p. 274-275. The district court 
appears to have the power to order in a party and realign if necessary I.R.C.P. l 9(a)(l). 
Judge Petrie even acknowledged that "in hindsight" he should have just granted Mr. 
Piercy' s motion for summary judgment based upon Mr. Piercy' s affirmative defense. R., Vol. 6, 
p. 968. 
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Mr. Piercy therefore requests that this Court find that LC. § 5-224 does not apply to Mr. 
Piercy's affirmative defense regarding the validity of the 1982 Ordinance. 
IV. RESPONDENTS WAIVED THEIR STATUTE OF LIMITATION DEFENSES 
Judge Ford and the Respondents incorrectly analyze the issue of waiver (1) regarding the 
Respondents' initial waiver of their statute of limitation defenses, (2) regarding the stipulation 
and order barring defenses regarding the timing of the Amended Action for Declaratory Relief 
and (3) the effect of having allowed the trial on the merits of the 1982 Ordinance without 
objecting to timeliness. 
A. The Respondents Waived any Statute of Limitation Defenses Barring Mr. Piercy from 
Challenging the 1982 Ordinance. 
As set forth in detail in the Appellant Brief, the Respondents failed to raise LC. § 5-224 
or any other statute of limitation that would prevent Mr. Piercy's challenge until one month prior 
to the trial and after the parties had entered into a stipulation to reorder the parties and Judge 
Petrie issued an order adopting the language of the stipulation. Appellant's Brief, p. 2-11. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8( c) states: "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall 
set forth affirmatively ... statute of limitations .... " Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h) states: "In 
pleading the statute of limitations it is sufficient to state generally that the action is barred, and 
allege with particularity the Session Law of the section of the Idaho Code upon which the pleader 
relies." 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that, "Under the civil rules, compliance with the 
governing statute of limitations is not a requirement for subject matter jurisdiction; rather, the time 
bar of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that may be waived if it is not pleaded by 
the defendant." Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788, 791, 992 P.2d 783, 786 (Ct.App. 1999). 
The Respondents all had multiple opportunities to raise any statutes of limitation to prevent 
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the challenge to the 1982 Ordinance, but it was not until a month before the trial on the merits that 
they raised a statute of limitations defense. The Respondent's did not offer any evidence of the 
statute of limitations at trial. The evidence is clear that prior to the stipulation entered into by the 
parties on September 4, 2008, the Respondents had not raised a statute of limitations as a defense 
barring Mr. Piercy's challenge to the 1982 Ordinance. 
Respondent Sutton attempts to argue that somehow arguing equitable estoppel and !aches 
preserved the Respondents' ability to raise statute of limitations defenses. Defendant/Respondent 
/Cross-Appellant Jennifer Sutton's Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief at 9. This point actually 
bolsters Mr. Piercy' s position. Respondent Sutton is admitting that the Respondents had many 
opportunities to raise defenses relating to the timing of Mr. Piercy's challenge to the 1982 
Ordinance. The fact that Respondents raised defenses of estoppel and laches underscores the fact 
that they should have raised any other defenses regarding timing long before a month before the 
trial on the merits. 
Therefore, Respondents had certainly waived their statute of limitation defenses prior to the 
stipulation of September 4, 2008. 
B. The Plain Language of the Stipulation to Realign the Parties and the Judge's 
Subsequent Order is an Express Waiver of any Statute of Limitation Defenses. 
The critical question is whether the stipulation and subsequent order of the district court 
adopting the stipulation revive the waived claims. Judge Ford and Respondents incorrectly analyze 
the interpretation and effect of the stipulation and order. Judge Ford and Respondents both took the 
approach of combining an analysis of the plain language of the stipulation and order with an 
analysis of the possible intent behind the stipulation and order. Judge Ford is required to have 
looked at the plain language and only looked at the intent if the plain language was ambiguous. 
The plain language of Judge Petrie's order that adopted the parties' stipulation is as follows: 
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1. That the parties to the Action for Declaratory Judgment filed by Co-Defendant 
Sutton against Canyon County on October 15, 2007 be changed to reflect Dale Piercy as 
Plaintiff and Canyon County, Luis Guzman and Jennifer Sutton as Defendants. 
2. That Mr. Piercy be allowed to file an Amended Action for Declaratory Relief 
attached hereto as Exhibit A; 
3. That the suit created by Mr. Piercy' s filing of the Amended Action for Declaratory 
Relief remains combined with the above-captioned action between Plaintiff Guzman and 
Co-Defendant Sutton and Piercy; 
4. That Canyon County, Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton may Answer the Amended 
Action for Declaratory Relief filed by Mr. Piercy as provided for in the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure; 
5. That all rulings, orders, decisions and scheduling dates and deadlines which have 
been entered by the Court in the above-captioned case be applied to the action created by 
Dale Piercy's filing of the Amended Action for Declaratory Relief as they applied to the 
original Action for Declaratory Relief filed by Co-Defendant Sutton; 
6. That Canyon County, Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton waive any defenses they may 
have regarding the timing of the filing of Mr. Piercy's Amended Action for Declaratory 
Relief. 
R., Vol. 4, p. 671-672. 
The plain language of this order allows the defending parties to file answers. Judge Ford 
found that this meant that Respondents could include whatever defenses were available in their 
answers. Looking at the plain language of paragraph four by itself, Judge Ford's interpretation 
would be justified. That interpretation, however, ignores the more specific language of paragraph 6 
that causes a waiver of "any defenses they may have regarding the timing of the filing of Mr. 
Piercy's Amended Action for Declaratory Relief." Id If you take the common meaning of the 
words in paragraph 6, their meaning would encompass statutes oflimitation defenses. 
It is the same with paragraph 5. While paragraphs 2 and 3 read by themselves would 
suggest that a new action is being initiated that would allow the parties to start over with a new 
litigation; paragraph 5 limits that by applying all rulings, orders and decisions to the new action. 
18 
The prior orders include discovery limits, motion limits and a trial schedule that includes a trial 
beginning a month from the order. The prior orders also included Judge Petrie's order that the 
legitimacy of the 1982 Ordinance be determined by a trial on the merits with Canyon County as a 
defendant. 
Judge Petrie's order allows for the parties to be realigned and for those parties to draft their 
own pleadings, but then limits the action to the san1e issues that existed prior to the order. 
An analysis of the facts beyond the plain language of the stipulation and order also shows 
that neither the parties to the stipulation or Judge Petrie, intended to create new issues or to resurrect 
waived issues. As stated previously, the subject stipulation and order were filed about one month 
prior to the trial. The district court had already rnled on a motion to reconsider the equitable 
estoppel and laches issues (R. Vol. 4, p. 572-592) and Mr. Piercy's motion regarding other legal 
challenges to the 1982 Ordinance. R. Vol. 4, p. 593-595. The parties had already filed their pre-
trial memorandums. R. Vol. 4, p. 599-661. Not one of the Respondents included any indication 
that they would be raising statute of limitations defenses to attempt to prevent Mr. Piercy from 
challenging the validity of the 1982 Ordinance. 
The facts show without a doubt that the issues regarding the 1982 Ordinance had, for more 
than a year, been painstakingly litigated and reduced to the sole question of whether the evidence 
showed that the Canyon County Commissioners had illegally attempted to create a herd district in 
1982. After all this time and litigation it would defy all reason to think that Judge Petrie or the 
parties involved intended to enter into a stipulation that would create a entirely new line of defenses 
or issues just prior to trial. Especially where there was no provision for additional discovery or 
motion practice. 
Mr. Piercy, therefore, requests that this Court find that the stipulation and subsequent order 
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did not resurrect or allow Respondents to raise statute of limitation defenses. 
C. Respondents \Vaived any Statutes of Limitation Defenses by Failing to Raise them at 
the Trial. 
Even had the Respondents Guzman and Sutton timely raised a statute of limitations defense 
by filing it in their answers to Mr. Piercy's Amended Action for Declaratory Relief, they waived 
those defenses at the trial on the merits. 
Respondent Guzman and Sutton filed their answers to Mr. Piercy's Amended Action for 
Declaratory Relief on September 19, 2008 and September 23, 2008, respectively. The trial was set 
for October 8, 2008. None of the Respondents made any motion in limine or other motion to 
prevent Mr. Piercy from proceeding to present his challenge to the 1982 Ordinance at trial. 
At the trial, the Judge started by making a statement and Mr. Piercy's counsel argued a 
motion in limine. Tr. p. 83-102. Mr. Piercy's counsel made opening statements. Tr. p. 102-109. 
Respondent Guzman's attorney then made opening statements. Tr. p. 110-115. At no time during 
these opening proceedings did Respondents make an objection or motion claiming that Mr. Piercy 
should not be allowed to proceed because the challenge was time barred by a statute of limitations. 
Evidence was submitted by stipulation and by live testimony. None of the evidence or 
testimony regarded statutes of limitation defenses. Tr., p. 116-188. Canyon County then made an 
opening statement and additional evidence was taken by live testimony. Tr. p. 189-214. 
Respondent Guzman then called a witness. Tr., p. 215-227. Following the bulk of the live 
testimony, the parties engaged in extensive discussions with the Judge regarding other witnesses 
and potentially other evidence. Tr. 228-248. Eventually, all parties rested and the trial was ended. 
At no time during any of the trial proceedings, did any of the Respondents object to Mr. Piercy 
challenging the statute or presenting evidence to challenge the 1982 Ordinance because of a statute 
of limitations. 
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This Court has held that waiver is, "the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is a 
voluntary act and implies election by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego some 
right or advantage which [the party] might at [the party's] option have demanded and insisted 
upon." Hecla J\;fin. Co. v. Star-A1orning }lfin. Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P .2d 1192, 1196 (1992). 
Based upon the above record of the pre-trial proceedings and trial proceedings, the 
Respondents by clear, knowing, intentional and unambiguous action waived any argument they had 
with regard to statutes of limitation by participating without objection to the trial on the merits of the 
1982 Ordinance. It is not surprising that Judge Petrie ignored the statute of limitations arguments in 
Respondents' post-trial briefing in his decision finding the 1982 Ordinance void. At that point, the 
statute of limitations arguments were completely irrelevant, because they had been waived. It 
would be unjust to allow a party after the evidence is closed at a trial to argue a statute of limitations 
defense that was not brought up during the trial. 
It should be noted that from the point in time that Respondents Guzman and Sutton raised 
the statute of limitations arguments in their post-trial briefing, Mr. Piercy has consistently objected 
to their attempt to make those arguments. Mr. Piercy has always claimed that these arguments were 
improper and has not consented in Judge Ford's decision to consider them. 
Therefore, even if Judge Petrie's order regarding the Amended Action for Declaratory 
Relief allowed the Respondents to raise statutes of limitation defenses, the Respondents waived 
those defenses by failing to raise them at trial, or making any such objection at trial. 
V. THE UNIQUE PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENT OF THIS CASE MAKES 
RESPONDENTS GUZMAN'S AND SUTTON'S STATUTES OF LIMITATION 
ARGUMENTS IRRELEVANT 
The facts in the record undisputedly show that Respondent Canyon County never raised the 
statute of limitations defense under LC. § 31-857 or LC. § 5-224. Based upon the cases cited above, 
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Respondent Canyon County thereby waived those defenses. It is also undisputed that Respondent 
Canyon County was a wholly separate party from Respondents Guzman and Sutton. The record 
shows that Respondent Canyon County was specifically brought into the case in order to defend its 
ordinance. Respondent Canyon County was originally the only defendant in the declaratory 
judgment action. See, Tr. p. 43, L. 18-25 and Tr. p. 44-49 (colloquy between counsel for 
Defendant Sutton and Judge Petrie on bringing Canyon County into the case); R. Vol. 3, p. 445, 
468 (Order Denying Defendant Percy's Motion for Summary Judgment, Joining Canyon County, 
and Holding all Other Motions in Abeyance Until Canyon County's Herd District Validity is 
Determined). 
Once Respondent Canyon County consented to the challenge to its ordinance by Mr. Piercy, 
the other Respondents' statutes of limitation arguments appear irrelevant, even assuming that they 
had been properly raised. A rnling against Respondent Canyon County that the 1982 Ordinance is 
void, makes it the law in Canyon County. 
Respondent Sutton argues that Mr. Piercy failed to properly support this argument with case 
citations. Defendant/Respondent /Cross-Appellant Jennifer Sutton's Respondent/Cross-Appellant's 
Brief at 11. This appears to be a matter of first impression for this Court. Mr. Piercy could not find 
any cases where a county was ordered into a case and then acquiesced in allowing a challenge to 
one of its ordinances where other private persons were also parties to the lawsuit. This is simply a 
matter of procedure. Mr. Piercy has cited the procedural rules and cases regarding waiver of non-
jurisdictional defenses. 
The uniqueness of this case is demonstrated by the irrelevance of the authority cited by 
Respondent Sutton in response to Mr. Piercy's argument. Respondent Sutton cites LC. § 10-1202 
and argues that it provides her the right to argue that the 1982 Ordinance is valid. 
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Defendant/Respondent /Cross-Appellant Jennifer Sutton's Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief at 
12. Mr. Piercy agrees. Respondent Sutton had the opportunity to argue for the 1982 Ordinance's 
validity and did so the trial. Respondent Sutton's ability to argue the 1982 Ordinance's validity 
under I.C. § 10-1202 is irrelevant to the question of whether a private citizen's invocation of a 
statute of limitations regarding a challenge to a county ordinance is effective where the county itself 
has agreed to allow the challenge to proceed to a trial on the merits. It is certain that neither 
Respondent Sutton nor Guzman were representing Respondent Canyon County. The County had its 
own attorney. 
Therefore, Mr. Piercy requests that this Court find that Judge Petrie' s order that the 1982 
Ordinance is void is the law of Canyon County and that it applies to Mr. Piercy's case. 
VI. APPLYING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN l.C. § 31-857 OR LC.§ 5-224 TO 
MR. PIERCY'S CHALLENGE IS PROCEDURALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The 2009 amendment to I.C. § 31-857 and the application of I.C. § 5-224 in this matter 
would violate the substantive and procedural due process rights guaranteed by the Idaho and U.S. 
Constitutions. 
A. The Application of Statute of Limitations to Ch.allenges to the 1982 Ordinance ·would 
Violate Mr. Piercy's Rights to Procedural Due Process 
This Court has stated: Procedural due process requires that "there must be some process to 
ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the state or federal 
constitutions." Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 917, 926 
(1999); quoting: State v. Rhoades, 121Idaho63, 72, 822 P.2d 960, 969 (1991). 
This Court also held, "Due process 'is not a concept to be applied rigidly in every matter. 
Rather, it 'is a flexible concept calling for such procedural protections as are warranted by the 
paiiicular situation."" Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 133 Idaho at 91; quoting: City of Boise v. 
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Industrial Comm 'n, 129 Idaho 906, 910, 935 P.2d 169, 173 (1997); quoting: In re Wilson, 128 
Idaho 161, 167, 911 P.2d 754, 760 (1996). 
"A procedural due process inquiry is focused on determining whether the procedure 
employed is fair. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 'prohibits deprivation of 
life, liberty, or property without 'fundamental fairness' through governmental conduct that offends 
the community's sense of justice, decency and fair play."' Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136, 
Idaho 63, 72, 28 P.3d 1006, 1015 (2001); quoting: Maresh v. State of Idaho Dep't of Health and 
Welfare, 132 Idaho 221, 225-226, 970 P.2d 14, 19-20 (1998); citing: Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 
412, 432-34, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47, 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 428-29 (1986). 
This Court must engage in a two-step analysis in determining whether there has been a 
violation of procedural due process. Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136, Idaho 63, 72, 28 P.3d 
1006, 1015 (2001 ). The first step is to ascertain either a liberty or property under the Idaho 
Constitution or under the U.S. Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Once a court has determined that a 
property interest exists, it can determine what process is due. Id. A court must determine if sufficient 
notice and hearing were afforded to meet the due process requirements. Simmons v. Board of 
Trustees of Independent School Dist. No. I, 102 Idaho 552, 553, 633 P.2d 1130, 1131 (1980). 
"Whether a property interest exists can be determined only by an examination of the 
particular statute, rule or ordinance in question." Bradbury, 136 Idaho at 72, 28 P.3d at 1015; See 
also: Fergusen v. Board of Trustees of Bonner County Sch., 98 Idaho 359, 363, 564 P.2d 971, 975 
(1977). 
Open range is a property right. 'Open range' is defined as all areas of the state not within 
cities, villages, or already created herd districts. Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602, 606, 990 
P.2d 1213, 1217 (1999). Therefore, the default land status in Idaho is open range, when you are 
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outside of a city or a village. The Idaho Legislature then allowed private citizens to change the 
status of the land to a herd district through the petition process. See: I.C. § 25-2402-2404. 
A herd district would require specified animals to be contained by fencing. This would 
abrogate the previous right of landowners to allow their animals to roam at large. It also changed 
the ability for landowners to be free of liability in the event cattle were to cause damage to other 
persons' property. LC. § 25-2118. Interestingly, if the 1982 Ordinance is upheld, the only animal it 
controls is swine by operation of the statutory language and the failure of the Commissioners to 
identify the controlled animals in the Ordinance. 
Further, a herd district allows the district to tax the members of the district in order to 
construct fencing and put in livestock guards. So, the creation of a herd district also directly affects 
a persons' property. 
In taking away this property right, the Idaho Legislature required that counties provide 
notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the property right being taken by creation of a herd 
district. See: LC. § 25-2402-2404. 
By providing for the right to have notice and an opportunity to be heard, Mr. Piercy should 
have the right to challenge that process. Any statutes of limitation applied to his right would 
eliminate that the process provided under the state herd district laws by making it impossible to 
challenge the lack of the process after four or seven years had expired. 
Respondents argue that a four or seven year limitation to challenges to a county ordinance 
impacting districts of all kinds is reasonable. Respondent Sutton equates it to time limitations on 
post-conviction relief actions. Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant Jennifer Sutton's 
Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief at 37. 
This argument emphasizes the problem with the Respondents' claims. A person is certain to 
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know when the clock is ticking on a post-conviction relief action, because it begins upon the date of 
conviction. The person whose right is at stake would be present for the event that triggers the 
statute of limitations and therefore would have actual notice. With the ordinance in question, no one 
would know their rights had been impacted until it was too late to attempt to challenge the 
ordinance. The actual act making the ordinance challengeable would be hidden. 
In making a change to a highway district for example, county commissioners could make 
the change in complete secret violating all statutory safeguards. The district could then structure the 
ordinance so that the obvious effects of the passage of the ordinance would not occur for seven 
years and one day from the date of passage. This would essentially ensure that no one would know 
about the ordinance until it was too late to challenge. Application of any statutes of limitation to 
this type of county action is inviting the worst type of government abuse, because the abused would 
be powerless to challenge the ordinance. 
Again, this case is the perfect example. Mr. Piercy had his right to notice, petitioner, and an 
opportunity to be heard taken from him. Without realizing it, Mr. Piercy's land allegedly became a 
herd district and he was now legally liable to be sued if his cows escaped his property. It became a 
trap. The first time Mr. Piercy knows of the herd district is the first time he was sued in court for 
damages. Now Respondents argue that it does not matter that the herd district was illegally enacted, 
because Mr. Piercy' s action is barred by a vague statute of limitations or a recently enacted statute 
of limitations. Preventing Mr. Piercy from challenging the 1982 Ordinance essentially creates the 
recipe book for governmental abuse. 
B. Mr. Piercy's Substantive Due Process Rights \Vould be Violated by the Application of 
a Statute of Limitation to His Challenge of the 1982 Ordinance. 
The parties cited cases are in agreement regarding the standards for reviewing this type of 
action. The arguments cited above are equally applicable to Mr. Piercy's substantive due process 
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argument. It would be incredible to think that a government could limit the ability for the citizens to 
challenge illegal and void ordinances in circumstances where the abuse of process both makes the 
ordinance illegal and unable to detect the defective ordinance until it is too late. The application of 
statute of limitations to challenges to ordinances based upon lack of due process in the enactment is 
not rationally related to a legitimate governmental function and is unconstitutional. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Piercy has shown that Judge Ford erred in his ruling allowing Mr. Guzman and Ms. 
Sutton to raise the statutes of limitation found in LC. § 5-224 and amended LC. § 31-857 in order 
to overturn Judge Petrie's ruling that the 1982 Ordinance was illegal and void. Judge Ford also 
erred in finding that statutes of limitation on challenges to ordinances that effect property rights 
are constitutional. For these and the above stated reasons, Mr. Piercy requests that this Court 
reverse Judge Ford's rulings. 
Respectfully submitted this 17 day of April 2013, 
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1 ·.. .:,• ~;· SECTION 1. 1:hat Section 29-904 Idaho Code Annotated 
be and the same is hereby amended as follows : 
~~ "·'' · 3/!l "29-9~4. Capital . Deemed Security.-Whenever such 
compai:ies shall re~eive and acc:pt the office or appointment 
of assignee~, receivers, guardians, executors, administra-
!ors, or be d1_r~cted to execute any trust whatever, or engage 
m the comp1lmg of abstracts, the capital of the said com-
pany shall be taken a~d considered as the security required 
by the !aw for the faithful performance of their duties as 
aforesaid, and shall be absolutely liable in case of any de-
fault whatever * ..i.. provided that it shall be the duty of the 
commiSsioner of fi_nance. of ~he State of Idaho to annually 
make a .thoroug!i i;ivestigation of the fiscal affairs of such 
compan~es and if it be found after such examination that 
the capita~ of .such company is impaired, the commissioner 
of finance is giver; the power, and it is hereby made his duty, 
to suspend th~ right .of such _company to make and certify 
abstracts of title until su_ch time as the commissioner of fi-
?_tanc~ shall have determined that such capital is no longer 
i_mpaired, and the commissioner of finance is hereby author-
ized to promulgate such rules and regulations as are neces-
sary to carry this Act into effect." 
Approved March 2, 1935. 
CHAPTER78 
(S. B. No. 135) 
AN ACT 
AMENDING SECTION 6-507 OF THE IDAHO CODE ANNOTATED 
RELATING TO THE SERVICE OF WRITS OF ATTACHMENT 
AND OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENTS, AND PRO-
VIDING FOR THE METHOD, MANNER AND EFFECT OF 
SUCH SERVICE ON BANKING CORPORATIONS OPERAT-
ING BRANCH BANKS OR MORE THAN ONE OFFICE WHERE 
DEPOSITS ARE RECEIVED, AND DECLARING AN EMERG-
ENCY. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Section 6-507 of the-Idaho Code Anno-
tated shall be and the same is hereby amended to read as 
follows: 
"6-507. GARNISHMENT.-Upon receiving · informa-
c. 79 •35' IDAHO SESSION LAWS 133 
tion in writing from the plaintiff or his attorney, that any 
person or corporation, public or private, has in his posses-
sion or control, any credits .or other personal property be-
longing to the defendant, or is owing any debt to the defend-
ant, the sheriff must serve upon such person, or corporation, 
a copy of the writ, and a notice that such credits, or other 
property, or debts, as the case may be, are attached in pur-
suance of such writ. Provided, that in case of service upon 
a corporation the same may be had by delivering a copy 
of the paper to be served, if upon a· private corporation, to 
any officer or agent thereof, and if upon a public or munici-
pal corporation, to the mayor, president of the council or 
board of trustees, or any presiding officer, or to the secre-
tary or clerk thereof. Provided, further, that :no service of 
any writ of attachment, :nor of execution, nor any garnish-
ment, shall be made under this or the preceding section, or 
otherwise, on any banking or trust corporation operating 
branch banks or more than o:ne office where depo sits are re-
ceived, except by delivery of copies of the writs, notices 
and/or other papers required in other cases, to one of the 
officers or managing agents of such corporation employed in 
and at, and in charge of swne particular office or branch of 
said corporation, and being so made, such writ or garnish-
ment shall be valid and effective only as to moneys to the de-
fendant's credit in that particular office or branch and as to 
other personal property belonging to the defendant held in 
the possession or control of the officers or managing agents 
of said corporation employed in and at, _ and in charge of 
sucfl, office or branch." 
SECTION 2. An emergency existing therefor, which 
emergency is hereby declared to exist, this Act shall be in 
force and effect from and after it1? passage and approval. 
Approved March 2, 1935. 
CHAPTER79 
(S. B. No. 114) 
AN ACT 
CREATING A PRIMA F ACIE LEGAL PRESUMPTION THA_T AN 
ORDER OF A BOARD COUNTY COMMISSIONERS CREATING, 
ESTABLISHING, DISESTABLISHING, OR DISSOLVING ANY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, ROAD DISTRICT; HERD DISTRICT, OR 
OTHER DITRICT, RAS BEEN MADE PURSUANT TO . THE 
APPENDIXB 
c. 307 § 4055 PROCEEDINt;;S IN CIVIL ACTIONS 
pouesaion of them. Havird v . Lung (1911) 19 I . tained in an abstract may commence his action to 
790, 115 P. 930. recover dHmagel:I against the abstracter within three 
Where the posseasion of property Is acquired by years aft.er discovering the fraud or rohstake. Bil~ 
a tort no demand is ntlcessary prior to the institu~ lock v. Idaho etc, Co. (1912) 22 I. 440. 126 P . 612 
tion of suit 'for its recovery ; consequently the 42 L . R. A. (N. S.) 178. ' 
statute of limitation11 ia set in motion without such The test, under subd. 4, is not whether the fraud · 
demand. Ha.vird v . ·Lung (1911) 19 I. 790, 116 or mistake occurred in a. contract or independently · 
P. 930. of contract, but the test 111 whether the action aeeka · 
ha~:a~~ =~Piici:~io~e:to '{~:· ~:~~~i~~~ ~!kl~:.d,de~ re!lJ~d:~a~~J. o4n ::~~~~:i&"~f :if:~:~ ;:c~i~:k!~~ , ~:.,,N;,, 
talning or fnjurin1t g-o"ods or chattels, the period put a reasonably prudent per son upon inquiry ia :.f·;:!.~.~ >: 
::~~1~~1~:r!:~~~~~!~~!li; .. ~::~:~::~.: .. :~:::;i:~~··:: '.~1: 
personal injuries. Within two years: ~-,,~~:i·•i 
. 1. An action aipinst a sheriff'., co1:'oner ~r consta~le, upon .the ~iability g,;~.it .· . 
mcurred by the domg of an act m his official capacity, and m virtue of' :~v:<!·: '. 
·his office, or by the omission of an official duty, including- the nonpayment Vi'iff;: 
·of money collected upon an execution. :.\j~',;; :· 
2. An action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, where the ' :/it~)':. 
action is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except }'.i':,' 
when the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation. ··'f~t1< ' 
3. An action upon a statute or upon an undertaking in a criminal )f 
action for a forfeiture or penalty to a county or to the people of the state. -~f1).1 
L! . An action to recover damages for an injury to the person, or for 
the death of one caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another. 
5. An action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment 
or seduction. 
. 6. An action against a sheriff or other officer for the escape . of a 
prisoner arrested or imprisoned on civil process. ('03, p. 56, § 1.) 
Jli»t. (See ·c. C. P. '81, § 169). R. S. I 4066; am. 
·oa, p. 56, § I. reenacted R. C. § 4056. 
Comp. leg.-Cal. See C. C. P. 1872, § 339; ais 
nmcndecl : Kerr's 0. ib. 
If. D. Analogous: C. C. P. §§ 7376,-8. 
Cross ref. Claims again s t state two years; § 109. 
Cited ; Collman v. Wanamaker (1915) 27 I . 842 
346, 149 ~·. 292 ; Pindel v. R'olga.te (1916) 221 F: 
342, 137 C. C. A. 168, 348, Ann. Oas. 19160 98S. 
§ 4056. Actions to recover goods or money from officer~. 
one year: An action against an officer or officer de facto: 
1. To recover any goods, wares; merchandise or other property seized ~-· 
by any .. such officer in his official capacity as tax collector, or to recover ;: 
the price or value of any goods, wares, merchandise or other personal-.r" 
property so seized, or for damages for the seizure, detention, sale of or~; 
inj ury to, any goods, wares, merchandise or other personal property seized, 
. or for damages done to any person or property in making any such seizure'.,"'. ·-1n ..... ~-· 
2. For money paid t o any such officer under protest or seized by such : 
officer in his official capacity· as a collector of taxes, and which, it is::'• 
claimed, ought to be refunded. [R. S. § 4056.] '· 
·d 
Croaa ref. Recovery o:l fine1:1 in police courts one:· Hist. (See C. C. P. '81, § 160) R. S. § 4066, r e-
enacted R. a. lb. year : § 2221. ·•.' 
Comp. lea-.-Cal. AlmoHt identical except time 
is six. m onths: C. C. P. 1872, § 341; as amended. 
same through subd. 1 : Kerr's C. ib. -~~ • 
. ··1· q, 
§ 4057. Actions on claims against county. ·Actions on claims against? · 
a county which have . been rejected by the board of commisisoners:;· 
must be commenced within six months after the first rejection thereof by; .. 
such board. [R. S. § 4057.] 
Hi1t. (See C. C4 P. '81, § 161) R. S . § 4067, re- Cited: Weil v . Defenbach (1918) 31 I . 
enacted R 0. lb. 170 P . 103. 
<.:omp. ler.-Cal. Same: c. a. P. 1872, I 342; 
Kerr's C . ib. 
§ 4058. Actions on open accounts. In an action brought to recover 
a balance due upon a mutual, open and current account, where there hav~:; 
1602 
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been.reciprocal demands between the parties, t he cause of action is deemed 
to have accrued from the time of the last item proved in the account on 
either side. [R. S. § 4058.] 
Hist. (See C. C. P. ' Bl, § 162) R. S. i 4068, re-
enacted R . C. ib. 
Comp. ler.-Cal. Same : C. C. P . 1872, ·§ 344; 
Kerr'a C. ib. 
N. D. Similar: C. C . P . § 7879. 
.Applica tion: This section h a:t n o application to 
fees charged by the county for recordin fl of in stru .• 
ments. Lincoln Co. v. Twin F a ll:1 etc. Co. (1918) 
2S I. 439, ! SO P . 788. · 
§ 4059. Actions to recover deposits. To act ions brought to recover 
money or property deposited with any bank, banker, trust company or 
saving and loan society, no limitation begins to run until after an author-
ized demand. [R. S. § 4059.] 
Hi•t. (Se• C. C. P . '81, § 163) R. S. § 4069, re-
enact.ed R . C. ib. 
Corns>. le!f.-Cal.' No such p r ovision in C. C. P. 
1872 : different : K err' a C. § 348. 
Cited : Gwinn v. Melvin ( 1908) 9 I. 202, '12 P . 
961; Bates v. Cap. S. Bk. (1910) 18 I. 429, 110 
P. 277. 
§ 4060. Actions for other relief. An · action for relief not herein-
before provided for must be commenced within four years after the cause 
of action shall have accrued. [R. S. § 4060.] 
Hiat. (See C. C. P . '81, § 164) R. S. § 4060, re· .Acth>n a1ain•t officer: An action by a county 
"enactad R. C. ib. to r ecover from t he cler k of court, auditor and re-
Comp. leK.-Ca l. Same; C . C. P . 1872, § 34.3; :ts~i~n:~n~~s t~~e~~1!k. a~~~~~n~Y f::: iif~~~Y c~~= 
Kerr' s C. ib. lected bY. the clerk, etc., from th e county, i11 baned 
N. D. Analogous : C. C. P. § 7881. a fter four years. Bannock Co. ·v. Bell (1901) 8 I. 
Cited: Re Counties v. Alturas Co. (1894) 4 I . l, 65 P . 710. 
146, 37 P. 349 ; Chemung M. Co. v. Hanley (1904) Appuintment of ;idmint.trator: A ·proceeding 
fl I. 786, 77 P . 226; N elson v. Steele (1906) 12 I. f or the appointment ot an administrator h an ac-
762, 88 P. 96: Kill v . Emvire State etc. Co. (1908) tion w ithin the meaning of thi11 section e.nd it is 
168 F . 881, 885; Hailey v. R iley ( 1908) 14 I. 4.81, · barred if not commenced within four y ears from 
96 P. 686, 17 L . R. A. (If. S.) 86; Bashor v. Beloit the death of the decedent. Gwinn v. Melvin (1903) 
(lHl) 20 I. 692, 119 P . 66; Canady v. Coeur 9 I. 202, 72 P . 961. 
d' Alene L . Co. (1911) 21 I. 77. 120 P. 830 ; (erro- Acticm11 for dHrna&es : A ction s for damages against 
neously a s § 464) O lympia etc. Co. v . Kerns ( 1913) r eal p roperty come und er this section. Bo ise Dev. 
24 I. 481, 496, 136 P . 256. Co. v. Boise ( 1917) SO I . 675, 167 P. 10S2. 
§ 4061. Limitations apply: to state. The limitations prescr ibed in 
this chapter apply to actions brought in the name of .the state, or for the 
.benefit of the state, in the same manner as t o actions by private parties. 
[R. S. § 4061.] 
Hi•L (See C. C. P. '81, § 166) R. S. § 4061,. re-
enncted R . 0. ib. 
Comp, le&'.-Cal. Same : C. C. P. 1872. § 345 ; 
Kerr's C. ib. 
N. D. Similar: C. C. P. § 7382. 
action on behu.lf of a county to compel the com·· 
m issioners oi an other county to a p1loint an <1.c-
countant for the a i;)portion m ent ot the indebtedne111:1 
of the counties as prescribed by a county divi~ion 
act . R e Co1mties v . Alturad Co . . (1894) 4 I. 146, 
37 P. 349. 
Application to •tate: The statute of limitations Action by county: The statute runs against the 
applies to t)le 11tate a.s well as to Drivat e individ- county in a. civil action brought by it against tho 
·uals. Small v. S . (1904) ·10 I . 1. 76 P . 765. clerk, a uditor and recorder for lllegal fees und 
Limitation of section : Th ls section ia specifically compensation collected by him from the county du r-
rest r icted to the limitations "prescribed by thi:s ing hil:I term of office. ( Overrulina- Fremont Co. v. 
title," that is, of action s of a private n ature and Brandon, 6 I. 482. 66 P . 264; Quarles, C. J. d lS-
alla ins.t private individua111. It does not ~PI>b t o ?ie n ting ) B a nnoc k Co. 'V. Be ll ( 1901) 8 I . 1, 65 
an a ction to enforce a public duty, mch as an P . 710. 
§ 4062. Action to redeem mortgage. An action t o redeem a mort-
gage of r eal property, witp. or without an account of rents and profits, may 
be brought by the mortgagor or those claiming under him, against t he 
mortgagee in possession, or those claiming under him, unless he or they 
have continuously maintained an adverse possession of the mor tgaged 
premises for five years after breach of some condition of the mortgage. 
[R. s. § 4062.J 
Hbt. (See C. C. P . '81, § 166) R . S . i 4062, re- Cited: Fountain v . L ewiston Nat. Bk, (1906} 
enacted R . C. lb. 11 I . 461, SS P . 605. 
Comp. le&".-Cal. Same: C. C . P. 1872. f .346 ; 
Kerr'Jt 0 . ib. 
§ 4063. Same: Partial redemption. If there is mor e than one such 
mortgagor, or more than one person claiming under a mortgagor, some of 
whom are not entitled to maintain such an action under the provisions of 
this title, any one of them who is entitled to maintain such an action may 
1603. 
